L

int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx){ X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; X509_NAME *xn; int bad_chain = 0; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param; int depth,i,ok=0; int num; int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; if (ctx->cert == NULL) {X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);return -1; } cb=ctx->verify_cb; /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is * present and that the first entry is in place */ if (ctx->chain == NULL) {if (((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||(!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))){ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end;}CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);ctx->last_untrusted=1; } /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ if (ctx->untrusted != NULL && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);goto end; } num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); depth=param->depth; for (;;) {/* If we have enough, we break */if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take * note of it and, if appropriate, use the * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error * code later. *//* If we are self signed, we break */xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */if (ctx->untrusted != NULL){ xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); if (xtmp != NULL) {if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)){ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end;}CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);ctx->last_untrusted++;x=xtmp;num++;/* reparse the full chain for * the next one */continue; }}break; } /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it * is self signed. */ i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {/* we have a self signed certificate */if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1){ /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact * match to avoid possible impersonation. */ ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;ctx->current_cert=x;ctx->error_depth=i-1;if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);bad_chain = 1;ok=cb(0,ctx);if (!ok) goto end; } else {/* We have a match: replace certificate with store version * so we get any trust settings. */X509_free(x);x = xtmp;(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);ctx->last_untrusted=0; }}else{ /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); ctx->last_untrusted--; num--; x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);} } /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ for (;;) {/* If we have enough, we break */if (depth < num) break;/* If we are self signed, we break */xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);if (ok < 0) return ok;if (ok == 0) break;x = xtmp;if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)){ X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0;}num++; } /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) {if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)){ if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; elsectx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; ctx->current_cert=x;}else{ sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); num++; ctx->last_untrusted=num; ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; chain_ss=NULL;}ctx->error_depth=num-1;bad_chain = 1;ok=cb(0,ctx);if (!ok) goto end; } /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification. */ ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx); if(!ok) goto end; /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */ if (ctx->verify != NULL)ok=ctx->verify(ctx); elseok=internal_verify(ctx); if(!ok) goto end;#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto end; ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx); if (!ok) goto end;#endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); if(!ok) goto end; if (0) {end:X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); } if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); return ok;}